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ARGUMENT
L

THE SOLE ISSUE ON APPEAL IS WHETHER DEFENDANT KNEW
ABOUT THE GEOTECH REPORT, AND NOT WHETHER HE HAD A
DUTY TO DISCLOSE IT.
The only issue in this case is whether Defendant Matthew Kriser knew about the

1997 Earthtec Geotech Report ("Geotech Report"). Indeed, that was the scope and the
lone holding of the trial court in ruling on summary judgment: that the Andersons did not
"provide any evidence that [Defendant] Matthew Kriser knew that the real property in
question had collapsible soils unsuitable for the construction of a residence/5 {Judgment,
Add. 1 to Appellants' Opening Br.), thus, the court granted summary judgment for
Kriser.
The issue is not, as Kriser argues, whether Kriser owed a duty to disclose the
Geotech Report. (Appellee's Br. 5, 10-16.) This argument is a red herring, and the
Andersons did not brief it or argue it on appeal or even address it in their opening brief,
so the Court should disregard it.
Therefore, viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the Andersons, it is clear
that Kriser knew about the existence of the Geotech Report. Thus, the trial court should
not have granted summary judgment to Kriser.
When the trial court granted summary judgment for Kriser. its judgment contained
one—and only one—holding as its basis for summary judgment: that the Andersons did
not "provide any evidence that [Defendant] Matthew Kriser knew that the real property in
question had collapsible soils unsuitable for the construction of a residence/' {Judgment.
Add 1 to Appellants' Opening Br.). Contrary to Kriser's red herring argument, the trial
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court did not hold that Kriser did not owe a duty to disclose the report to the Andersons.
In fact, the trial court did not address or speak to that issue at all. The court's only
holding was that Kriser did not know about the Geotech Report, and therefore, summary
judgment in his favor was proper.
Now, however, Kriser argues not only that he did not know about the Geotech
Report, but that he did not owe a duty to disclose the Geotech Report. The Court should
wholly disregard this argument because the trial court did not so much as mention
whether Kriser owed that duty to the Andersons, let alone did it base its ruling on that
reasoning. As a result of the trial court's narrow holding, the Andersons did not raise that
issue on appeal or brief it in their opening brief. (Appellants' Br. 1.) Kriser, however,
briefed it at length. But because this Court does not consider issues not raised on appeal,
the Court should wholly disregard this argument. Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., Ill
P.2d 1033, 1039 n.7 (Utah 1989) (holding that because an argument was "not raised on
appeal," the supreme court did not consider it).
The only issue is whether Kriser knew about the Geotech Report, and viewing the
facts most favorably to the Andersons, it is clear that he did.
IL

WHEN KRISER SOLD THE LOT TO THE ANDERSONS, HE KNEW A
GEOTECHNICAL STUDY HAD BEEN COMPLETED.
As Kriser rightly points out, to overcome summary judgment, the Andersons had

to show a disputed fact concerning Kriser's knowledge of the Geotech Report. Viewing
the facts in a light most favorable to the Andersons, it is clear that there is a disputed

2

issue of material fact whether Kriser knew about the Geotech Report. Therefore, this
Court should reverse the grant of summary judgment for Kriser.
Kriser argues that the "record . . . is completely devoid" that Kriser knew a
geotechnical study had to be completed. (Appellee's Br. 7.) But Kriser testified in his
deposition that he knew the city required a geotechnical study to be completed before the
streets could be put in. (R. at 202; Kriser Dep. 19:20-21.) In other words, he knew that
when he sold the lot to the Andersons, a geotechnical study had to have been completed.
This fact alone justifies reversal of the summary judgment.
But Kriser made additional incriminating statements in his deposition. He
clarified his understanding of performing a geotechnical report for the subdivision. He
stated that he "knew that [a geotechnical study] had to be done before the city would
allow us to develop [the subdivision].55 (R. at 202; Kriser Dep. 19:21-23.)
So in spite of his insistence to the contrary, Kriser knew that the city required a
geotechnical study before it would have even allowed Kriser to develop the subdivision
at all. Therefore, Kriser had to have been aware that a geotechnical analysis had been
completed by the time he sold the lot to the Andersons.
And Kriser also admitted that it was his "general practice" to perform a
geotechnical evaluation before constructing the roads in a development. (R. at 94.)
These are at least three separate statements showing that Kriser knew that a
geotechnical report had to be completed before developing a subdivision. These
statements alone justify reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment because
they create a disputed issue of fact on the trial court's singular holding, i.e., whether
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Kriser knew a geotechnical study had been done for the Andersons' subdivision. Clearly,
from his own deposition testimony, he did, otherwise, he would not have been able to sell
the Andersons their lot and home.
Next, Kriser cites Fennell v. Green, 2003 UT App 291, 77 P.3d 339, for the
proposition that the plaintiff-homeowner could not recover against the defendantdeveloper because the homeowner (whose home was subject to a landslide because of
collapsible soils) did not "show that the seller had knowledge of the defects shown in a
soils study . . . ." (Appellee's Br. 7.)
Fennell is factually distinguishable, and Kriser misstates this holding from Fennell
to mold it for use in this case. In Fennell, the soils study did not show any defects in the
lot, which is why the plaintiff-homeowner could not charge the defendant-developers
with knowledge about bad soil—there was no evidence of bad soil.
In Fennell, the defendant-developer moved for summary judgment on the theory
that the geotechnical report—the equivalent of the Geotech Report in this case—did not
find any soil problems or landslide potential in the plaintiff-homeowner's lot. Id. at 343.
The supreme court held that the homeowner's claim failed because "there were no facts
presented to show that [the defendant-developers] knew of a possible landslide condition
on [the homeowner's lot]." Id.
In fact, the plaintiff-homeowner's argument that the defendant-homeowner knew
or should have known about landslide potential on the lot was blatantly refuted by the
soils expert, who conducted the soils report on the homeowner's lot and who testified that
there were no soil problems or no landslide potential on the homeowner's lot. Id.
4

Therefore, the homeowner's claim rightly failed, because the homeowner was trying to
charge the defendant-developers with knowledge they not only did not have, but with
knowledge that contradicted the knowledge the defendant-developers did have (the soils
expert, who conducted the soils tests and issued the report, found no collapsible soils or
landslide potential on the homeowner's lot).
In contrast, in this case, there is a soils report that warns about soil problems: the
1997 Earthtec Geotech Report, which was prepared for use in developing the subdivision.
And unlike the geotechnical report in Fennell, the Geotech Report in this case warned
about soil problems in the development and provided recommendations to mitigate
against soil problems. And it is already established that Kriser knew a geotechnical
report had to be completed before developing a subdivision. Therefore, Kriser, as a
developer of the property, was charged with knowledge of the report, which is addressed
in Section III infra.
IIL

DEVELOPERS, LIKE KRISER, ARE CHARGED WITH THE
EXISTENCE AND CONTENTS OF GEOTECHNICAL REPORTS, AND
HE HAD A DUTY TO DISCLOSE IT TO THE ANDERSONS.1
Kriser admitted that he was the developer of the Andersons' lot. (R. at 204; Kriser

Dep. 4:16-17.) Therefore, under Smith v. Frandsen, 2004 UT 55, 94 P.3d 919, and it
progeny, like Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp., 2006 UT 47, H 24 143 P.3d 283, 288,
Kriser had
1

The Andersons argue that, as noted supra, whether Kriser had a duty to disclose
the existence and/or contents of the Geotech Report is irrelevant, because that was not the
basis for the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment for Kriser, and therefore,
the Andersons did not appeal that issue. Even so, out of an abundance of caution, and
because Kriser raised it in his brief, the Andersons address it here.
5

a duty to exercise reasonable care to insure that the subdivided lots are
suitable for construction of some type of ordinary, average dwelling house,
and he must disclose to his purchaser any condition which he knows or
reasonably ought to know makes the subdivided lots unsuitable for such
residential building.
Smith, 94 P.3d at 924 (emphasis added) (citation and quotations omitted).
Under Kriser's theory, it was not reasonable for him, as the developer of the
subdivision, to know that the Geotech Report warned against soil problems. That is the
only argument through which he can escape liability under existing law as pronounced by
the supreme court in Smith and Yazd. The Andersons take the contrary position that it is
reasonable for Kriser—as the developer—to know about the 1997 Earthtec geotechnical
report that warns against soil problems in the development. Otherwise, a developer can
satisfy his duty to obtain the geotechnical report, but exercise willful blindness, never
read it, and escape liability because he chose to ignore it. Surely that is not the standard
the Utah Supreme Court meant to promulgate in Smith.
Moreover, Kriser admitted in his deposition that his "current occupation" was as a
u

[b]uilder/developer." (R. at 204; Kriser Dep. 4:16-17.) And as a developer, the

pronouncements from Smith undoubtedly apply to Kriser.
In addition, Kriser knew a geotechnical analysis had to be completed before the
city would allow the subdivision to be developed. (R. at 204; Kriser Dep. 19:20-23.) So
when Kriser sold the Andersons their lot, he must have known that a soils report had been
done. Yet he took no steps to comply with his duty by telling the Andersons about the
Geotech Report or its contents.
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Kriser, the developer, was in the best position to protect the Andersons—the
unsophisticated buyer—against bad soils and the trouble bad soil would bring. He
admitted in his deposition that he was a developer. As such, the Smith duties to ensure
that the Andersons' lot was suitable for an average home, and to disclose any condition
that he should have known would make the lot unsuitable for such a home, applies.
Kriser did not follow those duties. Therefore, the Court should reverse summary
judgment for Kriser.
IV.

KRISER PERSONALLY SIGNED THE "OFFER TO PURCHASE"; HE
WAS NOT ACTING IN A REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY.2
Personal liability extends to Kriser because he personally—not in a representative

capacity—signed the "Offer to Purchase," which the Andersons presented to him, as
''Seller.5' Therefore, Kriser is personally liable for failing to disclose the soils
information.
The "Offer to Purchase" clearly provided a line marked "Sellers Signature" [sic].
(Add. 2 to Appellants' opening Br.) Kriser signed his name on that signature line, and he
did not include any language such as "principal of Country Living Development, LLC,"
which would have established liability for the entity rather than Kriser personally.
Moreover, just above the signature line, it states that "Seller accepts the forgoing
[sic] offer on the terms and conditions specified above." Directly under that language,
Kriser signed his name on the "Sellers Signature" line.
2

Again, this issue is raised by Kriser (Appellee's Br. 11-14), but it was not a basis
for the trial court's ruling, it was not raised in the Andersons' opening brief, and it is
irrelevant to whether Kriser knew about the existence of the Geotech Report. The
Andersons address it out of an abundance of caution.
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It cannot be disputed that Kriser, not Country Living Development, LLC, signed
the Offer to Purchase as the seller of the lot. Therefore, personal liability extends to
Kriser without the need to pierce the corporate veil, as Kriser argues.
V.

THE DOCTRINE OF SUPERSEDING INTERVENING CAUSE DOES NOT
APPLY BECAUSE KRISER, THE DEVELOPER, DID NOT CONVEY THE
PROPERTY TO A BUILDER-CONTRACTOR.3
Finally, Kriser argues that the products liability tort doctrine of superseding cause

applies to relieve Kriser of his duty to disclose material information to a home buyer.
This is a misstatement of the law.
Kriser relies on Smith for the proposition that the "failure of a builder-contractor to
ensure adequate compaction, obtain a soils test, or review the soils report filed with the
city severs the duties and potential liablitiy of previous owners" is not accurate.
(Appellee's Br. 15.) Kriser quote from Smith: "Where a developer conveys property to a
residential contractor . . . ." Smith, 2004 UT 55, ^ 21 (emphasis added). In this case,
Kriser did not convey property to a residential contractor, which would have purported to
extinguish Kriser's duties as a developer (as established in Smith). Rather, it is not
disputed that Kriser conveyed the property to the homeowner—to the Andersons—thus,
Kriser's duties as the developer were not interrupted.
Therefore, the doctrine of superseding cause does not apply to relieve Kriser of
liability.
* Just as with several of the other issues raised by Kriser, this issue is raised by
Kriser (Appellee's Br. 14-16), but it was not a basis for the trial court's ruling, it was not
raised in the Andersons' opening brief, and it is irrelevant to whether Kriser knew about
the existence of the Geotech Report. The Andersons address it out of an abundance of
caution.
8

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the trial court's grant of
summary judgment for Kriser and remand for trial on the merits.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 17th day of July 2009.
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Charles L. Perschqi
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants
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